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Abstract. To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies, we look for
mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: e¢ ciency, (individual and coalitional) strategy
proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility), and fairness. We show that only a
uniform mechanism satises all three. We also show that all e¢ cient and strategy proof mecha-
nisms must function by assigning budget sets to the agencies and letting them freely choose their
optimal bundle. In choosing these budget sets, the agenciesprivate information has to be taken
into account in a particular way. The only way to additionally satisfy a weak fairness requirement
(regions with identical preferences should be treated equally) is by assigning all agencies the same
budget set, as does the uniform mechanism. Finally and maybe more importantly, we show that
the central government should not impose constraints on how much to fund an activity (e.g. by
reserving some funds only for a particular activity): otherwise, there are no e¢ cient, strategy proof
and fair mechanisms, no matter how small these constraints are. Our model is an application of
a production economy with a linear technology and generalized single peaked preferences. All our
results are true for other possible applications as well as a simpler model which allows free disposal.
JEL Classication numbers: D02, D04, D60, O2, R58
Keywords. regional development agencies, single peakedness, e¢ ciency, strategy proofness, coali-
tional strategy proofness, equal treatment of equals, no envy, production, uniform mechanism.
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1 Introduction
In the last century, regional development agencies (hereafter, RDAs) have played an important
role in implementing regional development policies. An RDA can be dened as a regionally based,
publicly nanced institution outside the mainstream of central and local government administration,
designed to promote economic development (Halkier and Danson, 1996).1 Earliest examples date
back to 1930s, like the Tennessee Valley Authority in US which was founded to provide ood control,
electricity generation, fertilizer manufacturing, and economic development in the Tennessee Valley,
a region particularly a¤ected by the Great Depression. Today, RDAs exist in many countries.
They have a wide range of functions and responsibilities which vary from country to country but
typically include activities such as providing (business, legal, technical) consulting services, carrying
out vocational training programs, nancing research and development projects or entrepreneurial
activities, and promoting the region to outside investors.
To achieve their objectives, RDAs typically use funds allocated to them every year by central
governments or international organizations. The total amount of resources allocated among RDAs is
quite large. For example, in the 2000-2006 scal framework, EU allocated 213 billion Euros (around
one-third of the EU budget) among its 271 regions (Funck, Pizzati and Bruncko, 2003). Between
1999 and 2007, England allocated 15.1 billion Pounds among its 9 regions (Daily Telegraph, 2009).2
Turkey, though its 26 RDAs were created only in 2006 as part of its EU accession process, projects
to allocate around 1 billion TL per year among them (Bas¸ Uçar, 2011).
Given the magnitude of funds involved and their potential e¤ects on the development of di¤erent
regions, it is essential to use a good mechanism to allocate central government funds among RDAs.
The existing literature on regional development, discussed at the end of this section, has however
remained silent about this issue. In practice, the methods and procedures used to allocate these
funds can be quite complicated, their design might seem rather arbitrary, and the criteria on which
the allocation is based can be quite vague.
1RDAs show a high degree of diversication in remits, organization, nance and activities. However, they typically
operate at arms length from sponsoring authorities, where the latter only interfere at the level of overall resources
allocation and broad policy guidelines. (Halkier et al., 1998; Hughes, 1998).
2The money is well-spent. In 2009, a study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers stated that when all their job creation,
protection and infrastructure projects mature, RDAs will generate £ 4.50 for regional economies for every £ 1 of public
spending (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2009). It is also interesting to note that
the UK government announced plans to abolish RDAs by 2012, with a view to future economic development being
undertaken by local enterprise partnerships, which will not receive funding from central government.
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For example, Turkey allocates funds among its RDAs as follows.3 First, a central planning
committee made up of the prime minister and several ministers determines a budget cap for
each RDA, based on data about each regions population and development levels as well as the
RDAspast performance measures. Next, the general secretary of each RDA is informed of this
budget cap and is asked to prepare a feasible plan that determines how much will be spent
on di¤erent activities. The submitted plans are evaluated by the ministry of development which
frequently demands the RDAs to revise their regional plans according to the ministrys countrywide
objectives.4 Once the plans are accepted by the ministry, the funds are released for the coming
scal year.
The existing literature on regional development does not provide guidelines to evaluate such
procedural designs. Nor does it discuss properties of a good mechanism. In this paper, we try
to ll this gap. We argue that, in case of the RDA allocation problem, there are three central
issues: strategic considerations, e¢ ciency, and fairness. In the form of essential properties
every good mechanism should satisfy, all three have played an important role in welfare economics,
in public economics (particularly, in the scal federalism literature) and in real-life applications of
mechanism-design, each cited at the end of this section. In this paper, using a theoretical model of
resource allocation among RDAs, we discuss the design of mechanisms that satisfy these properties.
Strategic considerations exist due to asymmetric information and a misalignment of incentives
between RDAs and the central government. Each RDA, both by location and organization, is in
direct contact with the region it serves. A signicant fraction of its board members, and in some
cases its general secretary, come from the representatives of the region. As a result, the RDA is
much better informed about the needs and preferences of its region than the central government.
For similar reasons, an RDA is most likely to give rst priority to the development of its own region.
This is a source of tension between the RDA and the funding central government institution which,
possibly, has di¤erent policy preferences than the agency.5 Asymmetric information, coupled with
3More details (in Turkish) can be found at Kalk¬nma Ajanslar¬Bütçe ve Muhasebe Yönetmeli¼gi, Resmi Gazete,
September 28, 2006.
4Until very recently, the ministry of development was called the State Planning Organization (DPT). Since the
1960s until recently, DPT has been solely responsible for making and implementing regional development plans in
Turkey. Such plans were generally latched on sectoral plans serving the priority goal of national industrialization
(Loewendahl-Ertugal, 2005). The ministry of development seems to be reluctant to give up this central planning
tradition. Its meddling in the RDAs regional development plans is currently a topic of controversy in Turkey
(Filiztekin et al, 2011).
5For a real-life example, see Footnote 4. A similar point is argued regarding local and central governments in the
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this conict of interest gives RDAs reason to be strategic when informing the central government
about their needs and preferences. Due to these reasons, it is important to design a mechanism that
guarantees truthful revelation of the RDAsprivate information about the regions. In mechanism
design, this objective is embodied in a well-known property called strategy proofness (also called
dominant strategy incentive compatibility) which roughly means that individual agencies can not
benet from gamingthe mechanism. We will also consider a stronger property, coalitional strategy
proofness, which additionally prevents coalitions of agencies to manipulate the mechanism in a
coordinated manner.
Another important concern in allocating funds is e¢ ciency (a.k.a. Pareto optimality). This
central notion requires that no alternative allocation of resources makes some regions better-o¤
without making any region worse-o¤. Given that there are a multitude of activities for which the
funds can be used, two aspects of the RDA allocation problem complicate the design of an e¢ cient
mechanism. To discuss them, it is useful to think of each RDA as having a production technology
that transforms resources spent on di¤erent activities to some measure of regional development such
as future increases in the regions per capita GNP. Then, the rst complication is that di¤erent
RDAs have potentially di¤erent production functions. That is, resources spent on an activity
(such as providing legal services to businesses) can potentially a¤ect the development of di¤erent
regions in di¤erent ways. Therefore, e¢ ciency requires specifying not only the amount of funds
allocated to each region, but also how much resource each activity should receive in a way that
takes this information into account. The second complication is that an RDA does not necessarily
have monotone preferences on its budget. As is standard in producer theory, given its production
technology and the relative (intertemporal) prices, an RDA has a (possibly nite) optimal demand
for resources to spend on di¤erent activities.6 In the next section, we will use a generalized class
of single-peaked binary relations (preferences) to model these features of agencies. E¢ ciency then
requires this preference information to be taken into account (while strategy proofness ensures
its truthful revelation).
Our third criterion, fairness has always been a central concern in regional development as well
as in development economics. Aside from its philosophical appeal, by reducing disparities among
scal federalism literature (e.g. see Oates, 1999, 2005).
6Another possible reason for nite resource demand is the fact that the central government evaluates the RDAs
performance by comparing the inputs it uses to the services it produces. Therefore, it is suboptimal for an RDA to
demand an ine¢ ciently high level of resources.
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regions fairness ensures economic and social stability.7 Thus, reducing disparities between the
regions levels of development is stated as one of the main objectives of regional development
policies of many countries such as UK (DTI, 2006) or the EU (Article 158 of the EU Treaty). In
this paper, we analyze two formulations of fairness that have been central in the mechanism design
literature. The rst one, no-envy (Foley, 1967) requires that every RDA weakly prefers its share to
the shares of others. The second property, called equal treatment of equals, is signicantly weaker.
It applies only in the very unlikely case of two regions having identical preferencesand requires
for them that each should be indi¤erent between its share and the share of the other.
In Section 3, we propose and discuss a uniform mechanism which satises all of the above
properties. In Section 4, we then proceed to show that it is in fact the only mechanism to do so. In
that section, we also characterize the classes of mechanisms that satisfy (i) e¢ ciency as well as (ii)
e¢ ciency and strategy proofness. We then discuss some common properties of these mechanisms
and use them to evaluate real-life designs, such as the one in Turkey.
All e¢ cient and strategy proof mechanisms (including the uniform mechanism) are based on a
simple idea: the central government uses preference information to introduce budget caps to the
agencies (choosing the same budget caps for all in case of the uniform mechanism) but gives the
agencies full discretion in allocating their budget among activities. The idea is similar to what, in
the scal federalism literature, Oates (1999) calls unconditional grants or Levaggi (2002) calls
the classical solution for scal federalism. Using such rules (particularly giving the agencies full
reign in allocating their budgets) might seem an easy way out of our design problem. But, we
would like to emphasize our nding that there is no other way to simultaneously satisfy e¢ ciency
and strategy proofness. Even a tiny modication of the above mechanisms is bound to create either
an ine¢ cient or a manipulable mechanism.
In Section 5, we analyze the importance for our ndings of whether there are constraints on
how the mechanism allocates funds among activities. This is a very important issue for regional
development where it is quite common that governments or international organizations provide
some funds only for certain activities (such as the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fundwhich only supports rural development measures). Surprisingly, we show that existence of
7Consider the following quote from the European Commission Regional Policy Institute, Inforegio webpage: The
purpose of EU regional policy is to reduce the signicant economic, social and territorial disparities that still exist
between Europes regions. Leaving these disparities in place would undermine some of the cornerstones of the EU,
including its large single market and its currency, the Euro.
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such constraints lead to an impossibility: there are no e¢ cient, strategy proof and fair mechanisms
in applications where there is a lower bound on how much the mechanism can allocate to an activity,
no matter how small this lower bound is.
The RDA allocation modelthat we analyze is an application of production economies with a
linear technology and generalized single-peaked preferences. All our results apply to this domain,
and of course, to its other possible applications.
This paper contributes to the literatures on mechanism design in resource allocation, regional
development, and scal federalism. The mechanism design approach has recently been very fruitful
in many real-life resource allocation problems. Important examples include the design of FCC
spectrum auctions (e.g. see Milgrom, 2004), the re-design of American hospital-intern market (e.g.
see Roth, 2002), assigning students to public schools (e.g. see Abdulkadiro¼glu and Sönmez, 2003),
kidneys to patients (e.g. see Roth, Sönmez, Ünver, 2004), or military cadets to branches (Sönmez
and Switzer, 2011). This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the rst to approach the RDA
allocation problem from a mechanism-design perspective.
The theoretical literature related to our model starts with Hurwicz (1972), who shows for pure
exchange economies with two agents and two commodities that no individually rational mechanism
is both e¢ cient and strategy proof.8 This striking negative result is later extended in several
dimensions (more agents and commodities, public goods, and production economies with strictly
convex production sets), both for monotone preferences (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin, 1979;
Hurwicz and Walker, 1990; Zhou, 1991; Schummer, 1997 and 1999; Serizawa, 1999 and 2002;
Ju, 2003; Serizawa and Weymark, 2003; Leroux, 2004; Goswami, Mitra, and Sen, 2011) and its
superdomain of single-peaked preferences (Amorós, 2002; Morimoto, Serizawa and Ching, 2009;
Adachi, 2010; Anno and Sasaki, 2010).
The only positive result in the literature is obtained by Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) who
analyze production economies with monotone preferences and a linear technology. They show
that an equal budget free choice mechanismuniquely satises e¢ ciency, strategy proofness, and
anonymity. Our RDA allocation model has a signicantly larger class of preferences than the
Maniquet-Sprumont model. This domain extension makes strategy proofness a stronger require-
ment since, intuitively, more liesare now possible. Existence of desirable solutions to the RDA
8This result is closely related to the well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem which states that a social choice
function dened over an unrestricted domain with at least three alternatives is strategy-proof if and only if it is
dictatorial.
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problem is, therefore, not guaranteed by their study. However, our results are naturally consistent
in the sense that the uniform mechanism that we propose boils down to the Maniquet-Sprumont
proposal in case of monotone preferences. Additionally, even though these authors do not discuss
the implications of allocation constraints, our impossibility result (Theorem 8) applies to their
setting as well, since its proof only uses monotone preferences.
The uniform mechanism is also related to Sprumont (1991) and the following literature (sum-
marized by Thomson, 2012), which shows in case of a single activity that, a uniform rulesatises
e¢ ciency and strategy proofness as well as many other desirable properties, including no-envy, and
equal treatment of equals.
Our paper also contributes to a more applied literature on RDAs and particularly, their or-
ganizational structures and responsibilities as a function of the countrys political preferences or
level of development (Bennett et al., 2001; Syrett and Silva, 2001). This literature shows that,
especially in less developed areas such as Turkey, Portugal, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, na-
tional governments retain considerable discretion and ltering capacity to determine what RDAs
should (or should not) do (e.g. see Benneworth, 2001; Gualini, 2004; De Bruijn and Lagendijk,
2005; McMaster, 2006; Lagendijk, Kayasu and Yas¸ar, 2009). This is a source of tension between
the agencies and the central government organizations (e.g. see Filiztekin et al, 2011). In the
connes of our model, this practice seems problematic. As will be seen in our results, e¢ ciency
and strategy proofness require that the central government should not attempt to a¤ect allocation
of funds among activities, even in the form of lower bounds on money to be spent on a particular
activity; instead, it should only interfere (say for equity purposes or to favor some regions) when
determining the monetary budget of the agencies and then, only by introducing bounds on the
agenciesbudget choices.
Finally, our paper also speaks to the public nance literature on scal federalism (reviewed
in Oates 1999 and 2005). A recent strand of this literature has utilized asymmetric informa-
tion models to discuss issues such as decentralization of government (Seabright, 1996; Tommasi
and Weinschelbaum, 2007), determination of taxes (Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau, 1998)
and redistributive policies (Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini, 2001), or the use of random audit
mechanisms to induce a regional government to truthfully reveal local parameters (Gilbert and
Rocaboy, 2004). The regional governments in some of these models di¤er from RDAs in important
aspects though. For example, they typically collect taxes and are governed by election-motivated
politicians. A more related work to ours is Levaggi (2002) who analyzes the trade-o¤s a central
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government faces between imposing its own preferences on a regional government and optimally
allocating the regional budget among services. Levaggi argues that a double budget constraint
(where the central government limits not only the regional budget but also its allocation among
activities) might be an optimal compromise and notes that it is used in some countries such as
Italy. In case of multiple regions, however, we show that double budget constraints have strong
negative implications, both for an e¢ cient and a fair allocation of resources.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the RDA allocation model.
Section 3 introduces the uniform mechanism and discusses its properties. Section 4 presents the
uniqueness result. Section 5 discusses the implications of constraints on how to allocate funds.
Section 6 concludes and Section 7 contains all proofs.
2 The RDA Allocation Model
The RDA allocation model, as will be discussed below, is a production economy with a linear
technology and generalized single peaked preferences.
The set of regional development agencies (RDAs) is N = f1; :::; ng and the set of activities
they can carry out is L = f1; :::; lg : In case of Turkey, N contains its 26 agencies and L contains
a union of all the activities that the RDAs can undertake (such as providing consulting services or
carrying out vocational training programs, etc.).
Each agencys consumption set is thus RL+, with a typical element x 2 RL+ interpreted as a
vector of monetary spendings on di¤erent activities.9
The central government has funds E that it will allocate among agencies as well as di¤erent
activities. A more versatile interpretation of E; that can be applied to other allocation problems
is as follows: the society (or say, the central government) is endowed with a linear production
technology which it uses to produce l commodities (which correspond to the l activities in the RDA
model) to be allocated among n agents. The (constant) rate of transformation between any two
commodities is normalized to 1. Therefore, the maximum amount of each commodity that can be
produced by the linear technology is the same, say E 2 R+. It is also useful to think of E as the
total endowment of a factor that is used to produce the l commodities.10
9Vector inequalities are dened as follows: x 5 y if and only if xk 5 yk for each k 2 L; x  y if and only if x 5 y
and x 6= y; x < y if and only if xk < yk for each k 2 L.
10 In the RDA allocation model, the government technology (which transforms uncommitted funds into funds for
particular activities) is linear since a dollar spent for activity A can be equivalently transformed into a dollar for
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A feasible allocation z =
 
z1; :::; zn

assigns a share zi =
 
zi1; :::; z
i
l
 2 RL+ to each agency i
(zik being money allocated to agency i only to be used on activity k) such that
P
N
P
L
zik = E: Let
Z be the set of feasible allocations.
We represent the private information held by each agency i with a binary relation Ri on the
agencys input (or consumption) space RL+. For lack of better terminology, we refer to Ri as
the preference relation of agency i. Our interpretation is that each agency is endowed with
a production technology that transforms money spent on di¤erent activities, x 2 RL+; into some
measure of development for its region (see Figure 1). The binary relation Ri is dened on the inputs
of this technology and xRiy means that, given the agencys production technology and the relative
intertemporal prices, the input vector x produces at least as high protsfor agency i as does y.11
In what follows, we will make assumptions about Ri and relate them to this interpretation.12
For a; b 2 R+ such that a  b; the choice set between a and b is
Y ([a; b]) =
(
y 2 RL+ j a 5
X
L
yk 5 b
)
:
If a = b; we will write Y (a) instead of Y ([a; a]). We denote the set of maximizers of Ri on a set
A  RL+ as
m
 
Ri; A

=

x 2 A j for each y 2 A; xRiy	 :
We dene the path of Ri as the set of its maximizers on all choice sets:

 
Ri

=
[
a2[0;E]
m
 
Ri; Y (a)

:
Note that 
 
Ri

need not be monotone or continuous (e.g. see Figure 2).
another activity B.
11The term prothere refers to the present value of future increases in the regions income minus the cost of the
input vector x. Such comparisons are not uncommon in measuring RDAsperformance, as presented in Footnote 2
for UK. Given this interpretation, the level curves of Ri are then, isoprot lines for the agency. Unlike in standard
producer theory, we use money spent on an input instead of the quantity of an input. Since our analysis is not
concerned with changes in input prices, this is without loss of generality.
12Since the mechanism we design will only need ordinal information about the agencies, we use binary relations
rather than functions to represent the agenciesprivate information. The two make a di¤erence only for cardinal
mechanisms that make intensity comparisons across agencies. Such information is signicantly more di¢ cult to collect
in practice (whereas, for the mechanism we propose, it will be su¢ cient for each agency to declare a nite set of
optimal choices) and its not clear to us if its intensity comparison across regions is meaningful.
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Figure 1: The production function of an agency in case of a single activity. Money spent on activity
1 is transformed into a stream of future returns through development. The interest rate r captures
time value of money.
For a tractable model, we make the following assumptions about Ri: First, as is standard, we
assume that Ri is complete and transitive. Second, we assume that for each a 2 [0; E] ; Ri has a
unique maximizer on Y (a) ; that is, m
 
Ri; Y (a)

is a singleton (see Figure 2). Third, we assume
that Ri is single-peaked on its path 
 
Ri

; that is, there is a most preferred bundle p
 
Ri
 2   Ri
such that for each x; y 2   Ri ; PL yk >PL xk PL pk  Ri or PL yk <PL xk PL pk  Ri
implies xP iy:13 The bundle p
 
Ri

is called the peak of Ri and represents the optimal input
bundle for agency i (see Figure 1). Let R be the class of all such binary relations, which we call
generalized single peaked preferences.14
The rst assumption is standard. The second assumption means that the agency has a unique
optimal way of allocating each monetary budget a 2 [0; E] among its l activities. The third as-
sumption means that the agency has single-peaked preferences on the amount of budget it receives.
Specically, it has an optimal budget which it (again, optimally) allocates as p
 
Ri

: These assump-
tions are satised by a large class of preferences, including continuous, strictly convex preferences
13We would like to emphasize that this assumption is signicantly weaker than requiring Ri to be single-peaked,
since our assumption only requires single-peakedness on a one-dimensional subspace of RL+.
14This class of preferences is signicantly larger than the single-peaked domains analyzed by the earlier literature.
On pure exchange economies, it is not possible to construct desirable mechanisms on such a large domain (Cho and
Thomson, 2011).
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Figure 2: The preference relation Ri satises our assumptions. Its unique maximizer on the choice
set Y (a) is x = m
 
Ri; Y (a)

; and its path (drawn in red and containing its peak p
 
Ri

) is 
 
Ri

:
(which contains the classical domainwith the additional assumption of monotonicity) as well
as the standard single-peaked preferences. Even the convexity and continuity assumptions can
be dropped as long as a unique choice from each choice set is possible (as shown in Figure 2).15
An RDA allocation problem is then
1. a nite set of agencies N = f1; :::; ng;
2. a nite set of activities L = f1; :::; lg ;
3. a xed amount of government funds E; and
4. a list of agency preferences R =
 
R1; :::; Rn

.
Throughout the paper, we will x N , L; E and represent an RDA allocation problem with a
preference prole R 2 RN . We will say that R exhibits excess demand when P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

> E,
that R exhibits excess supply when
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

< E; and that R exhibits no excess whenP
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

= E:
Our feasibility condition in Z does not allow free disposal of funds in case of excess supply. Even
though free-disposal is a natural assumption for the RDA allocation problem, it need not be so in
other allocation problems, some very similar to the RDA allocation problem. For example, in case
15This is not much of a restriction since all choice sets have the unit normal vector.
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of controversial investments with negative local externalities, such as the construction of a nuclear
power plant (or a prison or a waste-management factory) which no region prefers to host, the total
demandcan fall short of the central funds to be allocated. In such cases free-disposal is not sensible
since the central funds must be fully allocated for the investment to be carried out somewhere in
the country. To accommodate such possible applications, and for maximum possible generality of
our model, we do not allow free disposal. However, as will be discussed in the conclusion, all our
results trivially apply to a simpler model which allows free disposal.
We will evaluate allocations according to the following criteria. An allocation z 2 Z is e¢ cient
with respect to a preference prole R 2 RN if there is no alternative allocation that makes all
agencies weakly better-o¤ and some agencies strictly better-o¤, that is, if there is no z 2 Z such
that for each i 2 N; ziRizi and for some j 2 N; zjP jzj .
The following is a notion of fairness which has played a central role in the mechanism design
literature. An allocation z 2 Z is envy-free (satises no-envy) with respect to a preference prole
R 2 RN if every agency prefers its share to that of another, that is, if ziRizj for each i; j 2 N:
No-envy is based on the notion that all agencies have equal rights and an allocation which favors
an agency over another, by creating envy of the latter agency for the formers share, will violate
fairness.
In regional development, there are cases where not all regions are considered equals. For ex-
ample, EU divides its 271 regions into four categories from poorest to richest as (i) convergence
regions, (ii) phasing out regions, (iii) phasing in regions, and (iv) competitiveness and employment
regions. Convergence regions, being the poorest, receive much higher funds than the others. For
such cases, the envy-free notion should only prevent the envy of poorer regions to richer ones,
similar to the notion of hierarchical no envy proposed and analyzed in K¬br¬s (2003). In this paper,
we assume all regions to have equal priority. A thorough analysis of the asymmetric case requires
a separate study. We, however, present a discussion in Section 4.3.
For the reader who nds the no-envy requirement too demanding, the literature o¤ers a signif-
icantly weaker notion of fairness which only compares agencies with identical preferences. Equal
treatment of equals requires two agencies with identical preferences not to envy each other. An
allocation z 2 Z satises equal treatment of equals if for each i; j 2 N with Ri = Rj ; we have
ziRizj : As in the case of no-envy, this property can be weakened only to apply to regions in the
same development category.
A mechanism is a strategy space Si for each agency i along with an outcome function F :
13
(S1  S2  :::  Sn) ! Z that selects an allocation for each strategy vector (s1; s2; :::; sn) 2
(S1  S2  :::  Sn). Given an agency i and strategy prole s 2 S, let s i denote the strategy of
all agencies except agency i. A mechanism satises e¢ ciency, no-envy, or equal treatment of
equals if it always picks allocations that satisfy these properties.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism where the strategy space is simply the set of preferences
R for each agency i. Hence a direct mechanism is simply a function F : RN ! Z that selects an al-
location for each preference prole. In what follows, we will restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms.
By the famous revelation principle (e.g. see Myerson, 1979), this is without loss of generality.
A highly desirable property of a direct mechanism is that it is always in the agencies best
interests to be entirely truthful about their preferences. Hence, the agencies can never benet from
gamingsuch mechanisms. A direct mechanism F is strategy proof if
F i
 
Ri; R i

Ri F i

R
i
; R i

for each i 2 N; Ri; Ri 2 R and R i 2 RNni: That is, no agency i can be strictly better o¤
by misrepresenting its preferences. This makes revealing the true preferences a weakly dominant
strategy.
A stronger requirement takes into account coalitional manipulations as well. A mechanism F is
coalitional strategy proof if under no preference prole can a coalition of agencies be better-o¤
by misrepresenting their preferences in a coordinated manner, that is, for each R 2 RN ; M  N;
and R
M 2 RM , if there is i 2 M such that F i

R
M
; R M

P iF i (R) ; then there is j 2 M such
that F j (R)P jF j

R
M
; R M

:16
3 The Uniform Mechanism
In this section, we propose a direct mechanism to allocate central government funds among agencies
and activities.
Formally, the uniform mechanism, U is dened as follows: for each prole of declared pref-
erences R 2 RN ;
(i) (no excess) if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

= E; then for each i 2 N; U i (R) = p  Ri ;
(ii) (excess demand) if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

> E; then for each i 2 N; U i (R) = m  Ri; Y ([0; ])
16Note that ours is the stronger formulation of the property. A weaker version considers only coalitional manipu-
lations that make all agencies in the coalition strictly better-o¤.
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where  2 [0; E] satises P
N
P
L
mk
 
Ri; Y ([0; ])

= E and,
(iii) (excess supply) if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

< E; then for each i 2 N; U i (R) = m  Ri; Y ([;E])
where  2 [0; E] satises P
N
P
L
mk
 
Ri; Y ([;E])

= E:
Item (i) is trivial. If there are just su¢ cient funds to award each agency i its ideal bundle
p
 
Ri

, the uniform mechanism does that.
Item (ii) is about how the uniform mechanism rations the agencies when the government funds
are insu¢ cient. In this case, all agencies are o¤ered a uniform budget cap . An agency i whose
ideal bundle p
 
Ri

does not require a higher budget (i.e.
P
L
pk
 
Ri

5 ) receives precisely its
ideal bundle p
 
Ri

(which, in this case, coincides with the m
 
Ri; Y ([0; ])

in the formula). If on
the other hand, the ideal bundle of agency i requires a higher budget than  (i.e.
P
L
pk
 
Ri

> ),
agency i is rationed and receives precisely a budget of  which is allocated among the l activities
so as to maximize its declared preferences. That is, U i (R) = m
 
Ri; Y ([0; ])

:
Item (iii) is about how the uniform mechanism allocates the excess when the government funds
exceed the aggregate demand of the agencies. In this case, all agencies are o¤ered a uniform
lower bound . An agency i whose ideal bundle p
 
Ri

does not require a lower budget (i.e.P
L
pk
 
Ri

= ) receives precisely its ideal bundle p
 
Ri

(which, in this case, coincides with the
m
 
Ri; Y ([;E])

in the formula). If on the other hand, the ideal bundle of agency i requires a
lower budget than  (i.e.
P
L
pk
 
Ri

< ), agency i receives precisely this minimum budget of
 which is allocated among the l activities so as to maximize its declared preferences. That is,
U i (R) = m
 
Ri; Y ([;E])

:
Item (iii) is not necessary in a simplied model that allows free-disposal. Then, excess supply
is equivalent to no excess and the uniform mechanism is made up of only the rst two items.
Note that, in cases (ii) and (iii) ;  is chosen so as to allocate all available funds. The above
formulation, however, is not explicit about how the market clearing is determined. The follow-
ing algorithm is explicit about this choice: And it provides an alternative but equivalent denition
of the uniform mechanism.
The Uniform Algorithm
Step 0.
Determine if the problem exhibits (i) no excess, (ii) excess demand, or (iii) excess supply.
If no excess.
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Assign each agency its ideal bundle p
 
Ri

:
If excess demand
Step 1. Determine the set of agencies whose ideal bundle, p
 
Ri

; requires strictly less budget
than in equal division of E, that is
P
k2L
pk
 
Ri

< EjN j : If no such agency exists, let each agency
optimally allocate this equal budget among activities, that is, let U i (R) = m

Ri; Y

E
jN j

and
terminate the algorithm. Otherwise, assign each such agency its ideal bundle p
 
Ri

and move to
the next step.
Step 2. Determine the remaining agencies (say N 0) to be allotted and the remaining funds
to be allotted (say E0). If N 0 is nonempty, repeat Step 1 by replacing N with N 0 and E with E0.
Otherwise, terminate the algorithm.
If excess supply
Step 1. Determine the set of agencies whose ideal bundle, p
 
Ri

; requires strictly more budget
than in equal division of E, that is
P
k2L
pk
 
Ri

> EjN j : If no such agency exists, let each agency
optimally allocate this equal budget among activities, that is, let U i (R) = m

Ri; Y

E
jN j

and
terminate the algorithm. Otherwise, assign each such agency its ideal bundle p
 
Ri

and move to
the next step.
Step 2. Determine the remaining agencies (say N 0) to be allotted and the remaining funds
to be allotted (say E0). If N 0 is nonempty, repeat Step 1 by replacing N with N 0 and E with E0.
Otherwise, terminate the algorithm.
The equal division amount in the last step of the algorithm gives the market clearing in
our rst denition. The following example demonstrates how the uniform algorithm works in case
of excess demand.
Example 1 (Uniform algorithm in excess demand) Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g ; L = f1; 2g ; E = 100;
p
 
R1

= (7; 3) ; p
 
R2

= (5; 21) ; p
 
R3

= (20; 12) ; and p
 
R4

= (18; 18) : Note that the
four agencies ideal budget requirements are 10; 26; 32; and 36: We will also need to specify the
paths for the agencies preferences. For simplicity, assume they are all linear, that is, 
 
Ri

=
p
 
Ri
 j  2 R+	 for each agency i: The uniform algorithm, applied to this problem, works as fol-
lows. In the rst step of the algorithm, each agency is o¤ered a budget of 1004 = 25: Since agency 1
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requires a smaller budget than that, it is awarded its ideal bundle: x1 = (7; 3) : N and E are updated
as N 0 = f2; 3; 4g and E0 = 90: Equal division now gives each agency in N 0 a budget of 903 = 30:
Since agency 2 requires a smaller budget than that, it is awarded its ideal bundle: x2 = (5; 21) :
Once again, we update N 00 = f3; 4g and E00 = 64: Equal division now gives each agency in N 00 a
budget of 642 = 32: Since no agency in N
00 requires a smaller budget than that, we let each agency
in N 00 to optimally allocate this budget among activities. Agency 3 thus receives x3 = p
 
R3

and
agency 4 receives x4 = m
 
R4; Y (32)

= (16; 16) : The uniform mechanism thus picks the allocation
U (R) = x for this problem. The equal division in the nal step is what the previous denition picks
for , that is, E
00
jN 00j = 32 = :
The following example demonstrates how the uniform algorithm works in case of excess supply.
Example 2 (Uniform algorithm in excess supply) In the above example, let E = 120. The uniform
algorithm, applied to this problem, works as follows. In the rst step of the algorithm, each agency
is o¤ered a budget of 1204 = 30: Since agencies 3 and 4 require a higher budget than that, they are
awarded their ideal bundles: x3 = (20; 12) ; x4 = (18; 18) : N and E are updated as N 0 = f1; 2g
and E0 = 52: Equal division now gives each agency in N 0 a budget of 522 = 26: Since no agency
in N 0 requires a larger budget than that, we let each agency in N 0 to optimally allocate this budget
among activities. Agency 2 thus receives x2 = p
 
R2

and agency 1 receives x1 = m
 
R1; Y (26)

=
13
5 p
 
R1

= (18:2; 7:8) : The uniform mechanism thus picks the allocation U (R) = x for this problem.
The equal division in the nal step is what the previous denition picks for , that is, E
0
jN 0j = 26 = :
The following proposition shows that the uniform mechanism satises all our criteria.
Proposition 3 The uniform mechanism satises e¢ ciency, coalitional strategy proofness, and no
envy.
Due to Proposition 3, the uniform mechanism also satises the weaker requirements of strategy
proofness and equal treatment of equals.
Another desirable property of the uniform mechanism, not stated in the above proposition is as
follows. Even though it is a centralized mechanism (i.e. it is the central government that determines
the share of each agency), the uniform mechanism has a market-like interpretation. According to
this interpretation, the central government (much like the Walrasian auctioneer) determines the
budget setof each agency (i.e. the  above). Then, each agency chooses its optimal bundle from
17
its budget set. The budget sets are chosen to clear the market, that is, to equate aggregate supply
to aggregate demand.
As noted at the end of Section 1, the right to choose the agenciesnal consumptions is a source
of conict in applications. The uniform mechanism, with its two alternative interpretations, each
interpretation giving the right to choose to one side, reconciles this tension.17
4 Characterization Results
In this section, we characterize the classes of mechanisms that satisfy our criteria, as we introduce
them one by one. We also discuss the policy implications of each criterion.
4.1 E¢ ciency
The following lemma characterizes e¢ cient allocations by two properties that point to an interesting
dualityin the RDA allocation problem. A mechanism can either x a budget for each agency and
then allocate each agencys budget among its activities, or alternatively it can x a budget for each
activity and then allocate each activity-budget among agencies. The two properties below require
either allocation be done optimally. Every e¢ cient mechanism, including the uniform mechanism
satises them.
The rst property (item (i) below) requires that for each agency, the total amount of funds
assigned to it need to be optimally allocated among activities. If it is violated, a Pareto improvement
can be obtained by switching to an alternative allocation of the same amount of funds among
activities.
The second property (item (ii) below) requires that all agenciesshares fall on to the same side
of their peaks. If it is violated, the aggregate funds determined for each activity can be reallocated
among the agencies so as to lead to a Pareto improvement. This second property is equivalent to
e¢ ciency in the one-dimensional model of Sprumont (1991). There, it is typically referred to as
same-sidedness. For multiple commodities, however, Amorós (2002) shows that this property is
weaker than e¢ ciency and analyzes its implications.
17 Independent of who makes the choice, however, the uniform mechanism explicitly states that the choice should
maximize the preferences of the agencies. It therefore takes position against any distortion of the agencieschoice by
the central government agencies, such as the ministry of development in the Turkish example.
18
Lemma 4 An allocation z 2 Z is e¢ cient with respect to R 2 RN if and only if
(i) for each i 2 N; zi 2   Ri and
(ii) if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

= E; then for each i 2 N; P
L
zik 5
P
L
pk
 
Ri

and if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

5 E; then for
each i 2 N; P
L
zik =
P
L
pk
 
Ri

:
Lemma 4 has two important policy implications. First, every e¢ cient solution to the RDA
allocation problem must give the agencies full discretion in allocating their budget among activities.
Central governments intervention in budget allocation, as exemplied in the case of Turkey in
Section 1, leads to ine¢ ciencies.
Second, the central government needs to take into account agencies declared preferences to
make sure that all consume at the same side of their ideal budgets. Ignoring this information,
again as in the case of Turkey, can lead to violations of e¢ ciency by forcing an agency to spend
too much while rationing another.
4.2 E¢ ciency and Strategy Proofness
The following proposition characterizes the class of mechanisms that are e¢ cient and strategy
proof. It states that every e¢ cient and strategy proof mechanism must employ budget upper and
lower bounds (respectively, the bi and ai functions below) and must allow each agency to maximize
its preferences in choice sets dened by these bounds (as stated in item (i)). The choice of such
bounds needs to be consistent to satisfy feasibility (as stated in item (ii)). Their construction is
therefore not trivial. Finally, the bounds imposed on an agency can only depend on the others
declarations, not that of agency i.
Proposition 5 A mechanism F is e¢ cient and strategy proof if and only if for each i 2 N; there
is ai : RNnfig ! R+ and bi : RNnfig ! R+ such that for each R 2 RN
(i) F i(R) =
8><>:
m(Ri; Y ([0; bi(R i)])) if
P
N
P
L
pk(R
i) = E;
m(Ri; Y ([ai(R i); E])) if
P
N
P
L
pk(R
i) < E
:
(ii)
if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

= E; then
P
N
P
L
mk(R
i; Y ([0; bi(R i)])) = E and
if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

< E; then
P
N
P
L
mk(R
i; Y ([ai(R i); E])) = E:
The uniform mechanism is e¢ cient and strategy proof. Thus, it is a member of the above class.
Also, the uniform algorithm presented in Section 3 can easily be generalized to construct other
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examples of e¢ cient and strategy proof mechanisms.
Proposition 5 has three important policy implications. First, it states that every e¢ cient and
strategy proof mechanism needs to use budget caps. Second, it states that an agencys budget cap
can not depend on the agencys private (preference) information. Both the uniform mechanism
and the Turkish mechanism presented in Section 1 satisfy this property. The Turkish mechanism,
however, errs on the side of caution by making the choice of an agencys budget cap also independent
of other agenciesdeclarations. As a result, the Turkish mechanism can end up wasting resources
by introducing caps that do not clear the market.
A third implication of Proposition 5 is that every agency should be able to choose its most
preferred bundle from its assigned choice set. For example, the uniform mechanism gives the
agencies full discretion in choosing their bundles. The Turkish mechanism again violates this
property since, as discussed in the introduction, the agencieschoices need to be ratied by the
ministry of development. This potentially incentivizes the agencies to manipulate the Turkish
mechanism by misrepresenting their private information.
Proposition 5 generalizes a characterization presented by Barberà et al (1997) for a single
activity. This relationship is further discussed in the appendix.
4.3 Fairness
As a member of the class of mechanisms described in Proposition 5, the uniform mechanism has an
interesting property: it o¤ers the same choice set (i.e. the same ai and bi) to every agency. Thus,
it is no surprise that the uniform mechanism additionally satises several fairness properties. More
surprisingly, the following theorem shows that even a very weak fairness requirement like equal
treatment of equals is satised by no other mechanism.
Theorem 6 The uniform mechanism is the only mechanism to satisfy e¢ ciency, strategy proofness,
and equal treatment of equals.
The uniform mechanism satises no envy and coalitional strategy proofness which are stronger
than equal treatment of equals and strategy proofness respectively. Thus, the latter properties
can be replaced with the former ones in the statement of Theorem 6. This theorem generalizes
a characterization presented by Ching (1994) for a single activity. The relationship is further
discussed in the appendix.
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Given the importance of fairness in regional development, Theorem 6 has important policy im-
plications. For a country where all regions have equal priority, it singles out the uniform mechanism
as the only mechanism to satisfy our criteria.
As discussed in Section 2, there are examples in regional development where policy makers
favor some regions over others. For example, EU territories are classied into four development
categories as convergence regions, phasing-out regions, phasing-in regions, and competitiveness
and employment regions. When allocating resources, EU only requires fairness among regions
in the same category and gives priority to poorer regions over richer ones. We next present a
straightforward extension of the uniform mechanism that allows asymmetric treatment of di¤erent
groups.
Let N be partitioned into N1; :::; Nm where N1 has priority over others, N2 has priority over
N3; :::; Nm; and so on. Let  = (1; :::; m) 2 (0; 1]m be such that 1 = 1 = 2 = ::: = m > 0: Then,
the -weighted uniform mechanism assigns groups budget sets of proportional size, using the
vector : It can be formally dened as follows: for each prole of declared preferences R 2 RN ;
(i) (no excess) if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

= E; then for each i 2 N; U i (R) = p  Ri ;
(ii) (excess demand) if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

> E; then for each j 2 f1; :::;mg and i 2 Nj ; U i (R) =
m
 
Ri; Y
 
0; j

where  2 R+ satises
mP
j=1
P
i2Nj
P
k2L
mk
 
Ri; Y
 
0; j

= E and,
(iii) (excess supply) if
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

< E; then for each j 2 f1; :::;mg and i 2 Nj ; U i (R) =
m

Ri; Y
h

 
j
 1
; E
i
where  2 R+ satises
mP
j=1
P
i2Nj
P
k2L
mk

Ri; Y
h

 
j
 1
; E
i
= E:
These mechanisms are both e¢ cient and strategy proof. If  = (1; :::; 1) ; they boil down to the
uniform mechanism. For di¤erent ; however, the -weighted uniform mechanism allows preferred
treatment of groups with higher priority. As a result it violates no envy and equal treatment of
equals. All -weighted uniform mechanisms however satisfy the following weakening of no envy
which requires that an agency prefer its share to that of another with equal or lower priority:
a mechanism F satises hierarchical no envy if h; h0 2 f1; :::;mg such that h 5 h0; i 2 Nh;
j 2 Nh0 ; and R 2 RN imply F i (R)RiF j (R) : This property is similar to the hierarchical no envy
property of K¬br¬s (2003). It also resembles the fairnessproperty used in matching markets (e.g.
see Balinski and Sönmez, 1999 or Sönmez and Switzer, 2011).
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The proportional treatment of di¤erent groups proposed in the -weighted uniform mechanisms
is, of course, one of the very many ways of asymmetric treatment. Choosing the best method
among alternative proposals requires a formal axiomatic analysis of an extended model. This is
left for future research.
5 Implications of Constraints on the Allocation of Funds
In this section, we discuss the implications of constraining the way central government funds can be
allocated among di¤erent activities, that is, constraining Z: Such constraints commonly appear in
applications since it is quite frequent that some funds are specically awarded for certain activities.
As an example, consider the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fundwhich only
supports rural development measures.
If  dollars out of the total E is reserved for an activity k; at least this much needs to be spent
on that activity. This imposes a lower bound of  on the amount of money that can be spent on
activity k. For k 2 L and  2 (0; E) ; we dene the k;  constrained feasible set as:
Zk; =
(
z 2 Z j
X
i2N
zik = 
)
:
A k;  constrained direct mechanism is then a function F : RN ! Zk; that selects a k; 
constrained allocation for each preference prole and thus, by denition, can not allocate less than
 on activity k.
The uniform mechanism does not directly apply to such problems due to cases where there is
excess demand for the central government funds to be allocated but at the same time insu¢ cient
demand for activity k (that is,
P
N
P
L pm
 
Ri

= E and
P
N pk
 
Ri

< ). Due to such prob-
lems, the uniform mechanism which would normally impose only a uniform upper bound on the
total budget each agency can allocate among activities, needs to be augmented with an additional
constraint, a uniform lower bound on the amount each agency can allocate on activity k. This
augmented uniform mechanism is both strategy proof and fair. The e¢ ciency requirement on
k;  constrained mechanisms should of course be weakened accordingly: an allocation z 2 Zk; is k; 
constrained e¢ cient if there is no z 2 Zk; such that for each i 2 N; ziRizi and for some j 2 N;
zjP jzj . The augmented uniform mechanism is not k;  constrained e¢ cient as demonstrated in the
following example.
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Example 7 Let N = f1; 2g, L = f1; 2g ; E = 20, k = 2, and  = 10. Let R1 and R2 be increasing
linear preferences with marginal rates of substitution of  2 and  4, respectively. For this problem,
a uniform allocation of both E and  gives both agencies the same choice set
x 2 R2+ j x1 + x2 5 10 and x2 = 5
	
:
The preferences of both agencies are maximized at the bundle (5; 5). The augmented uniform
allocation is then, z1 = z2 = (5; 5) : However, this allocation is not k;  constrained e¢ cient since
the allocation z1 = (3; 10) ; z2 = (7; 0) in Zk; makes both agents better-o¤.
There might of course be other ways of augmenting the uniform mechanism to take into account
the k;  constraint. We, however, nd that no matter how clever these mechanisms are, and no
matter how small  is, they will never satisfy our three criteria simultaneously.
Theorem 8 No k;  constrained direct mechanism simultaneously satises k;  constrained e¢ -
ciency, strategy proofness, and equal treatment of equals.
As part of its proof, this theorem adapts an argument developed by Serizawa (2002). The
relationship is discussed further in the appendix.
The proof of Theorem 8 gives us a hint as to the reach of its policy implications. The proof
makes specic use of problems where there is excess demand for the central government funds,
but insu¢ cient demand for activity-specic funds on an activity k, as in Example 7: Thus, in
applications where the agency preferences make this conguration a possibility, it warns the policy
maker about the impossibility of simultaneously meeting our three criteria.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a uniform mechanism to allocate central government funds among
regional development agencies. We showed that it is the only mechanism to satisfy three essential
criteria: strategy proofness, e¢ ciency, and fairness. We also provided a uniform algorithm to be
used in practice. To calculate the uniform allocation, this simple algorithm only uses a very limited
number of optimal choices from the agencies.
Our analysis also produced some interesting policy recommendations for the RDA allocation
problem: First, it is good practice to assign budget sets to the agencies and let them freely choose
their optimal bundle from their budget sets. Meddling in the bundle choice gives agencies incentive
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to misrepresent private information and potentially violates e¢ ciency. Second, in choosing these
budget sets, the agenciesprivate information has to be taken into account in a particular way.
Other ad hoc methods, such as the one in the Turkish example, can create e¢ ciency losses. Third,
fairness concerns need to apply only to the choice of these budget sets, not to the choice of the
nal bundle. In the simplest case where one aspires to assign all regions equal priority, the unique
fair way, as shown in the uniform mechanism, is to assign all agencies the same budget. Finally
but maybe most importantly, constraints on how central government funds can be allocated among
activities rule out the possibility of constructing desirable mechanisms, no matter how small these
constraints are.
It is useful to re-iterate that, though the paper is centered around an application to the RDA
allocation problem, the analysis applies to all production economies with a linear production tech-
nology and quite a large class of preferences that we call the generalized single peaked preferences.
This is mainly the reason why we do not simplify the model by assuming free disposal. There might
be other applications of our analysis where cases of excess supply need to be addressed.
Free disposal is however quite a natural assumption in case of the RDA allocation problem. As
noted earlier, all our results continue to hold under this assumption, where additionally the uniform
mechanism simplies as follows: (i) in case of no excess and excess supply, give all agencies their
peaks and (ii) in case of excess demand, follow the original denition in Section 3.
It is again useful to note that if there is a single activity, the uniform mechanism coincides with
the well-known uniform rule of Sprumont (1991). Thus, Theorem 6 extends the characterization
of Ching (1994) from allocation of a single commodity to production economies with multiple
commodities.18 If, on the other hand, we restrict the analysis to the subdomain of monotone
preferences, the uniform mechanism coincides with the equal budget free choice mechanism
proposed by Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) and shown to uniquely satisfy e¢ ciency, strategy
proofness and equal treatment of equals. Theorem 6 extends this result to the domain of generalized
single-peaked preferences. Although Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) do not discuss the implications
of production constraints, the negative ndings of our Theorem 8 also apply to their domain, since
our proof only uses monotone preferences.
18One important di¤erence between the two domains is that in case of a single commodity, e¢ ciency and strategy
proofness imply that the share of an agency only depends on its peak. This is not the case on our domain where
such rules, including the uniform mechanism, make use of more preference information than the agenciespeaks. Yet,
these rules are su¢ ciently insensitive to preference information, as shown in lemmas 9 and 10 in the appendix.
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7 Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 3) E¢ ciency follows from Lemma 4. For coalitional strategy proofness, let
R 2 RN ; M  N; and RM 2 RM : Let R =

R
M
; R M

; z = U (R) ; and z = U
 
R

: Suppose there
is i 2 M such that ziP izi: Then zi 6= p  Ri : By e¢ ciency of U; this implies P
N
P
L
pk
 
Rj
 6= E:
Assume
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Rj

> E (the proof for the alternative case is similar). By denition of U; there
is  2 [0; E] such that zi = m  Ri; Y ([0; ]) : Thus, P
L
zik =  <
P
L
pk
 
Ri

and
P
L
zik <
P
L
zik:
Case 1:
P
N
P
L
pk

R
j

= E: Then zik = m
 
Ri; Y
 
0; 

for some  2 [0; E]: Since  = P
L
zik;
we have  > : Since
P
N
P
L
zik = E =
P
N
P
L
zik; there is q 2 N such that
P
L
zqk >
P
L
zqk: Suppose
q 62 M: Then Rq = Rq and thus, P
L
zqk = min

;
P
L
pk (R
q)

= min

;
P
L
pk (R
q)

=
P
L
zqk; a
contradiction. Therefore j 2M:
Case 2:
P
N
P
L
pk

R
j

5 E: As in Case 1, there is q 2 N such that P
L
zqk >
P
L
zqk: This implies
zqP qzq: Suppose q 62 M: Then Rq = Rq: Thus, zq = m  Rq; Y  ;E for some  2 [0; E]:
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This implies
P
L
zqk =
P
L
pk (R
q) : Since
P
L
zqk 5
P
L
pk (R
q) ; we have
P
L
zqk 5
P
L
zqk; a contradiction.
Therefore, j 2M: This proves that U is coalitional strategy proof.
No envy and equal treatment of equals follow from the fact that U chooses the same choice set
for every agency and every agency chooses its most preferred bundle from this set.
Proof. (Lemma 4) ()) Assume z is e¢ cient with respect to R: We will rst show (i) :
Suppose there is i 2 N such that zi 62   Ri : Then, zi 6= mRi; Y P
L
zik

: Let xi =
m

Ri; Y
P
L
zik

: Then a Pareto improvement can be obtained by switching to z^ 2 Z dened
as follows: for each j 2 N n fig, z^j = zj and z^i = xi:
Next, we will show (ii). Suppose
P
N
P
L
pk
 
Ri

= E. Suppose for a contradiction there are
i; j 2 N such that PL zik < PL pk(Ri) and PL zjk > PL pk(Rj). Let  = 12 minfPL pk(Ri)  P
L z
i
k;
P
L z
j
k  
P
L pk(R
j)g. Dene z^ 2 Z as follows:
z^i = m(Ri; Y (
X
L
zik + ));
z^j = m(Rj ; Y (
X
L
zjk   )); and
z^q = zq; for each q 2 N n fi; jg:
Then, z^i P i zi, z^j P j zj , and z^q Iq zq, contradicting e¢ ciency.
(() Now assume that z 2 Z satises properties (i) and (ii) : Suppose bz 2 Z is a Pareto
improvement over z: Then there is some i 2 N such that bzi P i zi and for each j 2 N nfig, bzj Rj zj .
Note that by (i) ;
P
L
zik 6=
P
L
pk
 
Ri

: First, assume
P
L
zik <
P
L
pk
 
Ri

: If
P
L z^
i
k <
P
k z
i
k, consider
xi = m(Ri; Y (
P
L z^
i
k)). Note that z
i P i xi and xi Ri z^i. Thus, zi P i z^i, a contradiction. IfP
L z^
i
k >
P
L z
i
k, by feasibility, there is j 2 N such that
P
L z^
j
k <
P
L z
j
k. Let x
j = m(Rj ; Y (
P
L z^
j
k)).
Note that zj P j xj and xj Rj z^j . Thus, zj P j z^j , a contradiction. The proof for the caseP
L
zik >
P
L
pk
 
Ri

is similar.
The next two lemmas and the following proof establish Proposition 5. This result generalizes a
characterization presented by Barberà et al (1997) for a single activity. One can alternatively prove
it by using e¢ ciency to establish a relationship between our model and the one dimensional model
and then, make reference to the Barberà et al (1997) characterization (which they state without
proof). We prefer to present an independent proof that, in our opinion, highlights some interesting
properties of e¢ cient and strategy proof mechanisms.
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Our rst lemma shows that changing an agencys preferences without altering its peak has no
e¤ect on the choice set it will be o¤ered. If additionally the agencys optimal bundle on this choice
set remains unchanged, it receives precisely the same share as before.
Lemma 9 Assume that F is e¢ cient and strategy proof. Let R 2 RN , i 2 N , and R^i 2 R be such
that p(Ri) = p(R^i). Then,
P
L F
i
k(R
i; R i) =
P
L F
i
k(R^
i; R i). Additionally, ifm(Ri; Y (
P
L F
i
k(R
i; R i))) =
m(R^i; Y (
P
L F
i
k(R
i; R i))), then F i(Ri; R i) = F i(R^i; R i).
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that
P
L F
i
k
 
Ri; R i

5
P
L pk
 
Ri

: Then by Lemma
4,
P
L F
i
k

R^i; R i

5
P
L pk
 
Ri

:
Case 1. ((Ri) = (R^i)) Suppose
P
L F
i
k
 
Ri; R i

<
P
L F
i
k

R^i; R i

: By Lemma 4, F i
 
Ri; R i
 2
(Ri) and F i

R^i; R i

2 (Ri). But then, F i

R^i; R i

P i F i
 
Ri; R i

, a contradiction to
strategy proofness. Similarly,
P
L F
i
k
 
Ri; R i

>
P
L F
i
k

R^i; R i

creates a contradiction. Thus,P
L F
i
k
 
Ri; R i

=
P
L F
i
k

R^i; R i

: Since
m
 
Ri; Y
 X
L
F ik
 
Ri; R i
!!
= m
 
R^i; Y
 X
L
F ik
 
Ri; R i
!!
;
by Lemma 4, F i
 
Ri; R i

= F i

R^i; R i

:
Case 2. ((Ri) 6= (R^i)) Suppose PL F ik  Ri; R i < PL F ik R^i; R i : Now change Ri to
R
i
so that p
 
Ri

= p

R
i

and 
 
Ri

= 

R
i

(thus, we have m(Ri; Y (
P
L F
i
k(R
i; R i))) =
m(R
i
; Y (
P
L F
i
k(R
i; R i)))) but according to Ri; F i

R^i; R i

P
i
F i
 
Ri; R i

: By Case 1,
F i
 
Ri; R i

= F i

R
i
; R i

and thus, F i

R^i; R i

P
i
F i

R
i
; R i

: This contradicts strategy proofness. Similarly,
X
L
F ik
 
Ri; R i

>
X
L
F ik

R^i; R i

creates a contradiction (we now change R^i instead of Ri). The rest of the argument is the same as
in Case 1.
The following is an invariancelemma. It shows that an agency whose peak is above (below) its
assigned choice set can not end up on a higher (lower) choice set by declaring a di¤erent preference
relation. Dene
XFi
 
R i

=

F i
 
Ri; R i
 j Ri 2 R	 :
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Lemma 10 Assume that F is e¢ cient and strategy proof. Let
 
Ri; R i
 2 RN and let zi =
F i
 
Ri; R i

. If
P
L z
i
k <
P
L pk
 
Ri

and yi 2 RL+ is such that
P
L y
i
k >
P
L z
i
k; then y
i 62
XFi
 
R i

: Similarly, if
P
L z
i
k >
P
L pk
 
Ri

and yi 2 RL+ is such that
P
L y
i
k <
P
L z
i
k; then
yi 62 XFi
 
R i

:
Proof. First, assume
P
L z
i
k <
P
L pk
 
Ri

and yi 2 RL+ is such that
P
L y
i
k >
P
L z
i
k: Suppose for
a contradiction, yi 2 XFi (R i). Then, there is Ri 2 R such that F i( Ri; R i) = yi. Let R^i 2 R
be such that p(R^i) = p(Ri), m(R^i; Y (
P
L z
i
k)) = z
i, and yi P^ i zi. By Lemma 9, F i(R^i; R i) = zi.
Then, we have F i( Ri; R i) P^ i F i(R^i; R i), contradicting strategy proofness. The proof for the caseP
L z
i
k >
P
L pk(R
i) is similar.
We now use the above lemmas to characterize all e¢ cient and strategy proof mechanisms.
Proof. (Proposition 5) ()) Assume that F is e¢ cient and strategy proof. Let R 2 RN . Let
zi = F i(Ri; R i). First, assume that
P
N
P
L
pk(R
i) = E. By Lemma 4,
P
L
zik 5
P
L
pk(R
i). Let
R
i 2 R be such that p

R
i

= (E; :::; E) and dene bi
 
R i
 2 [0; E] as
bi
 
R i

=
X
L
F ik

R
i
; R i

:
If
P
L
pk(R
i) < bi(R i), then zi = p(Ri). Otherwise,
P
L
zik <
P
L
pk(R
i) < bi(R i) and by Lemma
10, F i(R
i
; R i) =2 XFi (R i), a contradiction. Alternatively, let
P
L
pk(R
i) = bi(R i). If
P
L z
i
k >
bi(R i), by Lemma 10, zi =2 XFi (R i), a contradiction. If
P
L z
i
k < b
i(R i), let R^i 2 R be
such that p(R^i) = p(Ri), m(R^i; Y (
P
L
zik)) = m(R
i; Y (
P
L
zik)), and F
i( Ri; R i) P^ i zi. Then, by
Lemma 9, F i(R^i; R i) = zi and F i( Ri; R i) P^ i F i(R^i; R i), contradicting strategy proofness. Thus,P
L z
i
k = b
i(R i) and by Lemma 4, zi = m(Ri; Y (bi(R i))): Combining the two cases, we can write
zi = m(Ri; Y ([0; bi(R i)])).
Second, assume that
P
N
P
L
pk(R
i) < E. By Lemma 4,
P
L
zik =
P
L
pk(R
i). Let Ri 2 R be such
that p
 
Ri

= (0; :::; 0) and dene ai
 
R i
 2 [0; E] as
ai
 
R i

=
X
L
F ik
 
Ri; R i

:
If ai(R i) <
P
L
pk(R
i), then zi = p(Ri). Otherwise,
P
L
zik >
P
L
pk(R
i) > ai(R i) and by
Lemma 10, F i(Ri; R i) =2 XFi (R i), a contradiction. Alternatively, let
P
L
pk(R
i) 5 ai(R i). If
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P
L z
i
k > a
i(R i), by Lemma 10, F i(Ri; R i) =2 XFi (R i), a contradiction. If
P
L
pk(R
i) 5
P
L z
i
k <
ai(R i), let R^i 2 R be such that p(R^i) = p(Ri), m(R^i; Y (ai(R i))) = m(Ri; Y (ai(R i))), and
zi P^ i F i(Ri; R i). Then, by Lemma 9, F i(R^i; R i) = F i(Ri; R i). Thus, F i(Ri; R i) P^ i F i(R^i; R i),
contradicting strategy proofness. Thus,
P
L z
i
k = a
i(R i) and by Lemma 4, zi = m(Ri; Y (ai(R i))):
Combining the two cases, we can write zi = m(Ri; Y ([ai(R i); E])).
Condition (ii) follows from feasibility of F .
((=) For the converse, note that strategy proofness follows from the fact that agency is option
set XFi
 
R i

= Y
 
0; bi
 
R i

(or XFi
 
R i

= Y
 
ai(R i); E

) is independent of Ri and for
each Ri, F i
 
Ri; R i

= m
 
Ri; Y
 
0; bi
 
R i

(or F i
 
Ri; R i

= m
 
Ri; Y
 
ai
 
R i

; E

:
E¢ ciency of F follows from (i).
The following proof extends an argument developed by Ching (1994) for a single activity to our
domain.
Proof. (Theorem 6) Let F be a mechanism that satises e¢ ciency, strategy proofness, and equal
treatment of equals. Let R 2 RN .
Case 1. If
P
N
P
L pk(R
i) = E, then by e¢ ciency, F (R) = U(R).
Case 2. Suppose
P
N
P
L pk(R
i) < E. Without loss of generality, suppose that
P
L pk(R
1) 5    5P
L pk(R
n). If R = (R1;   ; R1), then by e¢ ciency and equal treatment of equals, F (R) = U(R).
Alternatively, suppose R 6= (R1;   ; R1). Suppose for a contradiction, F (R) 6= U(R).
Step 1. Since F (R) 6= U(R), by feasibility and e¢ ciency, there is j 2 N such that PL pk(Rj) 5P
L F
j
k (R) <
P
L U
j
k(R). Let R^
j = R1. Then, by the denition of U ,
P
L U
j
k(R) =
P
L U
j
k(R^
j ; R j).
Also, by Proposition 5,
P
L F
j
k (R^
j ; R j) 5
P
L F
j
k (R
j ; R j). Thus,
P
L F
j
k (R^
j ; R j) <
P
L U
j
k(R^
j ; R j).
If (R^j ; R j) = (R1;   ; R1), this contradicts e¢ ciency and equal treatment of equals. Other-
wise, let eR = (R^j ; R j); dene S = ni 2 N j eRi = eR1o and note that for each i 2 S, we haveP
L F
i
k(
eR) <PL U ik( eR).
Step 2. By feasibility and e¢ ciency, there is q 2 N n S such that PL pk( eRq) 5 PL U qk ( eR) <P
L F
q
k (
eR). Let R^q = eR1. By denition of U , PL U qk (R^q; eR q) 5 PL U qk ( eR). By Proposition
5,
P
L F
q
k (R^
q; eR q) = PL F qk ( eR). Thus, PL U qk (R^q; eR q) < PL F qk (R^q; eR q). If (R^q; eR q) =
( eR1;   ; eR1), this contradicts e¢ ciency and equal treatment of equals. Otherwise, we go back to
Step 1 by re-dening R = (R^q; eR q) and noting that, by e¢ ciency and equal treatment of equals,
for each i 2 S [ fqg, we have PL U ik(R) <PL F ik(R).
Since there is a nite number of agencies, after a nite number of iterations of steps 1 and 2; we
obtain R = (R1;   ; R1) and F (R) 6= U(R). This contradicts e¢ ciency and equal treatment of
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equals.
Case 3. Suppose
P
N
P
L pk(R
i) > E. Then, the proof is similar except that, now the agencies
preferences are sequentially updated to Rn; the preference with the highest peak.
We next prove Theorem 8. The proof involves showing that a consumption lower bound on
an activity k, together with preferences that valueactivity k, xes a unique e¢ cient production
vector. On this subclass of preferences, thus, our problem boils down to a pure exchange economy.
We then use an argument similar to Serizawa (2002) to show the impossibility of a mechanism that
satises e¢ ciency, strategy proofness, and equal treatment of equals. The proof will make use of
the following denitions and Lemma 12 below.
Denition 11 For each R 2 R and z 2 RL+, let UC(R; z) = fx 2 RL+ j x R zg. For each
R 2 RN and i 2 N , let P i(R) = fzi 2 RL+ j z is e¢ cient with respect to Rg. For each i 2 N ,
Ri; R^i 2 R, R^i is a strict monotonic transformation of Ri at zi if (i) UC(R^i; zi)  UC(Ri; zi) and
(ii) z^i 2 UC(R^i; zi) and z^i 6= zi together imply that z^i P i zi. Let M(Ri; zi) be the set of strict
monotonic transformations of ui at zi.
Lemma 12 Let F be a strategy proof rule. For any R 2 RN , i 2 N , and R^i 2 M(Ri;F (R)),
F i(R^i; R i) = F i(R).
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that F i(R^i; R i) 6= F i(R). By strategy proofness, F (R^i; R i) R^i F (R).
Then, since R^i 2M(Ri;F (R)), F (R^i; R i) P i F (R), contradicting strategy proofness.
Proof. (Theorem 8) Let  2 (0; E). Suppose F is a k;  constrained direct mechanism that
satises e¢ ciency, strategy proofness and equal treatment of equals. Without loss of generality, let
k = 2. Let L0 = f1; 2g. Let R be the class of preferences that are (i) indi¤erent in amounts of
commodities in L n L0; (ii) continuous, strictly convex, homothetic, and smooth in RL0+ , and (iii)
strictly monotonic on the interior of RL0+ . Note that, by homotheticity, for each R 2 R, (R) is
linear. Let R  R be a class of preferences such that for each R 2 R, each x 2 (R)nf0g satises
x2
x1
< E  .
Let G be the restriction of F to RN . Then, G also satises e¢ ciency, strategy proofness,
and equal treatment of equals. Let R0; R1 2 R be two distinct Cobb Douglas preferences. Let
w = (E   ; ; 0; :::; 0) and d = wn . By e¢ ciency and equal treatment of equals, for each i 2 N ,
Gi(R0; :::; R0) = d. Let z = G(R1; R0; :::; R0). Note that by e¢ ciency,
P
i2N z
i = w. Note also
that, z1 is not proportional to w, because otherwise by strong monotonicity, either z1 P 0 d or
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d P 1 z1 and both cases contradict strategy proofness. Since G1(R0; :::; R0) = d, strategy proofness
implies z1L0 2 RL
0
++. Since z
1 6= w, by e¢ ciency and equal treatment of equals, for each i 2 N n f1g,
zi = w z
1
n 1 2 RL
0
++. Also, z
1 is not proportional to zi: Let R^0 2 R be such that R^0 2M(R0; zi).
We claim that G(R1; R^0; :::; R^0) = z. To see this, let G(R1; R^0; R0; :::; R0) = z^. By e¢ ciency,P
i2N z^
i = w. Since R^0 2M(R0; z2), by Lemma 12, z^2 = z2. By smoothness, R^0 and R0 have the
same marginal rate of substitution at z2. Thus by e¢ ciency, the marginal rate of substitution of
each i 2 N remains constant from zi to z^i. Then by homotheticity, for each i 2 N , z^i1
z^i2
=
zi1
zi2
: Let
S^ = z^2 + ::: + z^n and S = z2 + ::: + zn. Then, S^1
S^2
= S1S2 : Also S^ = S since otherwise, z^
1 = w   S^
and z1 = w   S imply z^11
z^12
6= z11
z12
, a contradiction. Then, z^1 = z1. This, by equal treatment of
equals, implies that z^i = zi for each i 2 N n f1g. To sum up, we showed G(R1; R^0; R0; :::; R0) =
G(R1; R0; R0; :::; R0) = z: Sequentially changing the preferences of agencies 3;   ; n and applying
the above arguments, we obtain G(R1; R^0; :::; R^0) = z.
Now, let R^1 2 R be such that d P^ 1 z1: Let z1 2 [z1; w] be such that z1bI1d and note
that z1 > z1. If R^0 was a Leontie¤ preference relation, we would have P 1

R^1; R^0; :::; R^0

\
UC

R^1; z1

= [z1; w]: However, Leontie¤ preferences are not in our domain. Nevertheless, R^0 can
be chosen arbitrarily close to a Leontie¤ preference and by doing so, the set P

R^1; R^0; :::; R^0

\
UC

R^1; z1

can be approximated to [z1; w]: By strategy proofness and G(R^0; :::; R^0) = d, we also
have G1(R^1; R^0; :::; R^0) R^1 d. Thus by e¢ ciency, G1(R^1; R^0; :::; R^0) is arbitrarily close to a member
of [z1; w]. But then, by strict monotonicity, G1(R^1; R^0; :::; R^0) P 1 G1(R1; R^0; :::; R^0) = z1. This
contradicts strategy proofness of G.
Since G does not simultaneously satisfy e¢ ciency, strategy proofness, and equal treatment of
equals, so can not F:
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